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IS KARL'S KODE KAPUT?
Fred H. Miller*
I. INTRODUCTION
The theme of this Symposium is: "Is the UCC Dead, or Alive and
Well?" It might seem odd to ask that question about a statute enacted in
all fifty states, which has been termed "the most spectacular success story
in the history of American law."' However, it may be that all is not as
well as the record suggests.
First, while the Code is widely enacted, it is less than fully uniform.
After twenty years, Vermont still has not updated its version of Article
9.2 More than a decade after the 1977 amendments to Article 8, two
states, Alabama and Vermont, have not yet enacted the amendments.'
Even current Code efforts are not uniform. Thus, while forty-four
jurisdictions have enacted new Article 4A basically without amend-
ment,4 new Article 2A, five years after its promulgation, is law in only
thirty-one jurisdictions;5 four of those still abide by the original version
as it read before it was amended in 1990 to accommodate non-official
amendments that California and other states enacted when they em-
barked on a program of non-uniform amendments to the original text.6
Moreover, even the text of Article 2A, as enacted in the remaining
twenty-seven jurisdictions with the official 1990 amendments, is not uni-
form, principally but not solely because of what may be termed "con-
sumer related" amendments.7
* Kenneth McAfee Centennial Professor, George Lynn Cross Research Professor, and
Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma. Professor Miller is Executive Director of the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), one of the two spon-
sors of the Uniform Commercial Code. He is a member of the American Law Institute (ALI),
the other Code sponsor, and serves on the Permanent Editorial Board (PEB) for the Code.
1. 1 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1, at 5
(3d ed. 1988). The Code, in whole or in part, governs in all 50 states, the District of Columbia
and the U.S. Virgin Islands. 1 id at 1, 5. All citations are to the 1990 Official Text of the
Code unless otherwise noted.
2. 1 i at 1 n.1.
3. 1 id. at 1 nn.1-2.
4. See [State UCC Variations] U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) xvii-xviii (1992).
5. See id. at xiii-xiv.
6. See id.
7. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 4-2.5-101-533 (1992); MINN. STAT. § 336.2A-101-529
(Supp. 1993). Interestingly, the consumer-related amendments are not all consumer protec-
tive. For example, the California amendments, for reasons best known to their drafters, seem
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Even where the text of the Code appears uniform, it may not be.
For example, a significant number of non-uniform laws outside the Code,
particularly consumer protection statutes or regulations, may change the
results reached under the UCC provisions. Even where the UCC recog-
nizes this, so that "amendment" outside the UCC is not misleading, the
end results still may not be uniform from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.8
Worst of all, however, the UCC may be increasingly less relevant in
providing the applicable rule in commercial contexts. For example,
although originally driven by consumer-type considerations concerning
funds availability, the UCC's provisions regarding check collection have
been substantially preempted by Regulation CC,9 the implementing regu-
lation under the Expedited Funds Availability Act.10 This is a significant
inroad, 1 and federal preemption is not limited to this one area.)2 Also
conventions and model laws, which become the paramount law of the
land if adopted by the United States, increasingly internationalize com-
mercial law. As a result, the Code becomes less relevant to an increasing
number of transactions which, absent the federal rule, it might otherwise
have governed.
1 3
Thus, a close look suggests that the Code, if not dead, may be morti-
fying. The theme of this Article, however, is that, upon an even more
careful examination, the Code is alive and very well. Nonetheless, to
to cut both ways. To illustrate, California's version of § 2A-104 broadly permits consumer law
outside Article 2A to override the 2A provisions, but California's version of § 2A-106 reduces
the protection of consumer lessees against choice-of-forum clauses in leases. CAL. COM. CODE
§§ 10104, 10106 (West 1990 & Supp. 1993). On reflection, one may surmise this merely repre-
sents the legislative process, which seldom is one-sided and often candidly involves some
"horse trades." A uniform law, ultimately destined to be legislation, is often crafted no differ-
ently. Indeed, NCCUSL policy on criteria for uniform acts includes consideration of whether
the act will be enacted by a substantial number of jurisdictions. See NCCUSL, REFERENCE
BOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 97
(1992-1993 ed.) (Statement of Policy Establishing Criteria and Procedures for Designation and
Consideration of Acts (Aug. 2, 1988)).
8. To illustrate, to the extent that U.C.C. § 3-302 refers to and defers to the Federal
Trade Commission Holder Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 433 (1992), uniformity of the rule, albeit outside
the UCC, is achieved. However, state consumer protection rules, such as UNIF. CONSUMER
CREDrr CODE § 3.204 (1974), also take precedence over other UCC sections, such as § 3-602.
To that extent, because the Uniform Consumer Credit Code is not the law in every state and
state consumer law is not uniform, the end results are not uniform from state to state.
9. 12 C.F.R. pt. 229 (1992).
10. 12 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4010 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
11. Numerous comments to UCC Article 4 refer to the extent of preemption by Regula-
tion CC and its impact on Article 4.
12. There always has been a federal presence in commercial law, such as the Federal Bills
of Lading Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 81-124 (1988). But of late the presence seems to be rapidly grow-
ing. See, e.g., Barkley Clark, Secured Transactions, 42 Bus. LAW. 1333, 1333-95 (1989).
13. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-105 (1990).
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maintain its health, some precautionary medicine must be administered.
This Article discusses the probable prescription.
II. Is THERE AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE CODE?
The UCC is unique: It is a uniform law enacted in every state and
covers a broad range of both simple and complex transactions of tremen-
dous legal, social and economic significance. In addition to its commer-
cial importance, the UCC is one of the best examples of the viability of
state government. It demonstrates that the federal system continues to
make sense by evidencing that state legislatures, and cooperating groups
like the NCCUSL and the ALI, can do a competent, indeed an outstand-
ing, job of crafting and updating state law. Nonetheless, one may reason-
ably ask: Would it not be more rational, especially given the current
degree of federal preemption and internationalization, to replace state
action with action by Congress?
There are good reasons to conclude that this alternative is not desir-
able. I" First, Congress is seldom able to act responsibly, particularly on
a matter as broad and complex as commercial law-at least as Congress
is presently structured. Members of Congress rarely study, formulate the
details of, or draft legislation themselves. Those tasks are largely dele-
gated to their staffs, who serve the members of Congress directly, or
work indirectly on the staffs of the various committees.15 While the staff
for the most part is composed of bright and hard working people, they
tend to be young, of short tenure and have very limited real experience.
Their knowledge of and experience with economics, institutions, the real-
ities of how commerce functions and its legal processes, comes largely
from books. As one consequence perhaps, a continuous lack of realistic
rules emanate from Congress. For example, many bankers believe the
availability times of the Expedited Funds Availability Act are a cause of
serious fraud losses for financial institutions. 6 The discretion and detail
many federal laws leave to a regulatory agency also shows Congress's
14. For a similar discussion of the undesirability of relying on Congress, see Fred H.
Miller, The Uniform Commercial Code: Will the Experiment Continue?, 43 MERCER L. REV.
799, 801-02 (1992).
15. See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY'S GUIDE TO
CONGRESS 482 (3d ed. 1982) ("Staff ... is given responsibility for much of the legislative
decision-making . . . . [They] develop ideas, initiate proposals for bills, and drum up
support.").
16. See, eg., AMERICAN BANKERS ASS'N, ABA CHECK FRAUD SURVEY 1992, at 24
(1992) (opinion mixed as to whether exposure to check fraud losses increased due to imple-
mentation of Regulation CC: 45.4% believed exposure increased, 37% experienced no change,
and 17.5% had inadequate basis to judge).
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lack of a detailed grasp of the problems engendered by the legislation. 7
Another example of Congress's inability to competently legislate detail is
demonstrated in the Food Security Act: "Although even the most pejo-
rative hyperbole is inadequate to fully express what section 1324 [the
Food Security Act] deserves, the following is a frail attempt: Section
1324 is internally inconsistent, unintelligible, and unworkable.... It is a
disaster."'"
Second, most observers would also acknowledge that special inter-
ests significantly shape, and perhaps even corrupt, the congressional law-
making process. The legislative hearing process often appears more
devoted to establishing a record for reelection than to sorting out facts to
frame a solid product. This process often produces an amalgamation of
independent provisions derived from the proposals of various groups,
which are not always synthesized, rather than an integrated, thoughtfully
drafted statute.
Third, the congressional process is usually slow as well as imperfect.
The problems referenced above may result in stalemate on a given sub-
ject. In other cases, they may prolong focus on a subject that prevents
action on other subjects.
A final, but no less important reason for questioning the wisdom of
encouraging federal legislation, is more philosophical; it is reflected in the
Tenth Amendment to the Constitution and the underlying principles
upon which the United States was founded. 9
III. CODE REALISM
If comprehensive congressional action is not an acceptable solution,
is the Code bound for a slow death as it descends into selective irrele-
vance and a posture of increasing non-uniformity as revisions to it or new
articles are promulgated? Such revisions and articles always will be nec-
essary for reasons similar to those driving the present decade-long Code
17. For example, 12 U.S.C. § 4008(c)(1) (1988) states: "In order to carry out the provi-
sions of this chapter, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System shall have the
responsibility to regulate (A) any aspect of the payment system ... ; and (B) any related
function of the payment system.. . ." Id. Talk about blank checks!
18. Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Introduction to the Uniform Commercial Code Annual Sur-
vey: Some Observations on the Past, Present, and Future of the UC. C., 41 Bus. LAW. 1343,
1352 (1986); see also Fed Reluctantly Passes Consumer Benefit Rules, DAILY OKLAHOMAN,
Sept. 11, 1992, at 18 (reporting Federal Reserve Board members' consternation over regula-
tions mandated by Truth in Savings Act). "'The net result of the massive costs of this regula-
tion will be to reduce savings yields.'" Id. (quoting Federal Board Member John P. LaWare).
"'This is a sledgehammer approach'" to some abuses. Id. (quoting Board Vice-Chairman
David W. Mullins).
19. See U.S. CONsT. amend. X.
[Vol. 26:703
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revision process. These reasons include: (1) technological developments
(presently electronic funds transfers; electronic data interchange; auto-
mated check processing and truncation); (2) developments in business
and other practices (presently the advent of leasing as an important com-
mercial alternative, variable rate notes; uncertificated securities and the
holding of securities in accounts without certificate issuance; the advent
of floating liens, informational services and better procedural devices that
render bulk sales legislation outdated or inefficient); (3) divisions of au-
thority because of statutory ambiguities or changed policy perspectives;
(4) the need to modernize language and to increase uniformity by includ-
ing previously excluded areas that have developed in importance; and (5)
accommodation of changes in other law that relates to the Code (as pres-
ently in the cases of the Expedited Funds Availability Act and the Bank-
ruptcy Code).
To address this question, one must first assess what a realistic goal
for the Code includes. That goal does not include, and probably never
included, rigid uniformity. Indeed, one virtue of approaching the goal of
uniformity in commercial law through the vehicle of state law, as op-
posed to federal legislation, is that local differences may be accommo-
dated as long as they do not involve core issues. The Code itself
accomplishes some of this.2" More importantly, local differences are rec-
ognized, but variances often are compromised out in preparing current
Code revisions. 21 Beyond that a limited number of non-uniform varia-
tions can be tolerated, as long as uniformity on basic issues is
maintained.22
20. For example, U.C.C. § 4-106 on "payable at bank" instruments and § 9-401 on "place
of filing" recognize regional differences and choices, on which reasonable minds may differ.
This can, if overlooked, give a misleading impression. Thus, Professor Friedman states: "The
Code, however, was ruthless in its attitude toward regionalism. The notion that any state in
the Union might conceivably have an economic or social interest which called for an exception
to the Code was considered heresy, and in fact not tolerated." LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 675-76 (2d ed. 1985).
21. See infra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
22. For example, see 1 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 20-22, which states:
If one puts himself in the position of a lawyer who is attempting to resolve a commer-
cial law problem for a client in 1938 on the one hand and in 1988 on the other, would
anyone doubt that the lawyer in 1988 would find the law more uniform, more cer-
tain, more precise and more sensible?
I Id. at 21. This Article agrees that core uniformity is a realistic goal of the Code. Non-
uniformity from consumer law adjustments can for the most part be classified as falling within
this guideline, for seldom does consumer law impinge on a basic issue in the "commercial"
Code. Thus, comment 3 to U.C.C. § 4-101 suggests that consumer concerns should be ad-
dressed separately. Where consumer-oriented proposals of a more major nature are advocated,
they are customarily rejected in favor of more modest methods to address the perceived issues
in the Code. For example, Professor Rubin's arguments to radically alter the allocation bal-
April 1993]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:703
What of the past history of slowness in enactment and other basic
non-uniformity? The record of several new articles suggests that prior
enactment experience is no longer an accurate guide under the newer
emphasis on this process in the NCCUSL.2 3 Significant non-uniformity
beyond consumer provisions, however, may remain a problem that re-
quires additional prescriptive medicine. To explore this matter, consider
the action of the California Bar Committee that studied the original ver-
sion of Article 2A. The committee recognized that the goal of uniform-
ity must be given considerable weight and should prevail over the
tendency of any state group that studies a product, nationally derived
through the efforts of the NCCUSL and the ALI, to rephrase it. Justifia-
bly, the committee feared destruction of the consensus reached in the
national formulation process. The goal of uniformity should also prevail
because, given enough time and effort, it is always possible to "improve"
any Code article, or any other proposal. Perfection, however, is an illu-
sory goal.
ance on losses from forgery and alteration (stated in revised Articles 3 and 4), so that the
balance is more in favor of consumers, have been rejected after careful consideration, and
much less drastic adjustments have been adopted. Compare Edward Rubin, Efficiency, Equity
and the Proposed Revision ofArticles3 and 4,42 ALA. L. REV. 551, 592 (1991) ("The revisions
of Articles 3 and 4 are superbly drafted ... however, they are deeply flawed.... [T]hey
generate excessive social costs by imposing unnecessary losses on consumers and providing too
few protections.") with CAL. COM. CODE §§ 3101-4504 (West Supp. 1993) (UCC Articles 3
and 4 as adopted in California).
Of course, if a particular consumer (or other) issue has gone beyond being a matter of
only local focus, the Code itself must accommodate it in order to maintain broad uniformity
with respect to basic issues. For example, the UCC accommodated the widespread denial of
the holder-in-due-course doctrine in consumer transactions involving negotiable instruments,
by specifically recognizing well-developed legislation and other regulations outside the Code.
See U.C.C. § 3-302(g) & cmt. 7. Where an issue is equally clear, but outside law is not per-
ceived to have developed to a high degree of uniformity, the Code may be amended to include
or recognize a specialized rule instead. To illustrate, the UCC has imposed limitations on
boiler-plate choice-of-law and choice-of-forum clauses in § 2A-106, and has recognized the
policy allowing the assertion of possible reasons for nonpayment in relation to consumer les-
sees in consumer finance leases in § 2A-407. Compare UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE
§ 3.404 (protecting consumer lessees) with FTC Rule on Preservation of Consumers' Claims
and Defenses, 16 C.F.R. pt. 433 (1992) (which does not apply to consumer leases).
As Articles 2 and 9 are revised, the challenge in the consumer context will be to identify
similar policy issues and try to reach consensus on them. Two such issues appear to be: (I)
limitations on disclaimers and limitations of remedy in consumer transactions; and (2) an ade-
quate remedy for secured party misbehavior in enforcing a security interest against a consumer
debtor. Both issues are more than local, and are of a basic nature. Today the law is not
uniform; any revision should be uniform on these issues in order to succeed.
23. Article 4A was enacted in 44 jurisdictions in three legislative years; revised Articles 3
and 4 were adopted in 19 jurisdictions in two legislative years; and Article 2A, since the 1990
amendments, has been enacted in more than twice the number of original enacting jurisdic-
tions. [State UCC Variations] U.C.C. Rep. Serv., supra note 4, at xiii-xix.
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Nonetheless, the California Bar Committee concluded that certain
non-uniform amendments of more than a local nature should be made
before Article 2A could be accepted for enactment in California. Those
amendments were made. What the committee did not appreciate, how-
ever, was that adopting those amendments would largely destroy their
earlier adherence to the goal of uniformity, because amendments in im-
portant states such as California are likely to be seriously considered else-
where, which indeed they were. Moreover, the existence of non-uniform
amendments in any state inevitably tempts other states to adopt non-
uniform amendments. Perhaps this temptation led to what happened
with Article 2A-the remaining states were reluctant to act and thus
postponed action until the choice between competing provisions was re-
solved. In contrast, the California Bar group is participating in the revi-
sion of Article 5 on letters of credit prior to its promulgation so that their
views can be factored into a uniform product. It is likely that the Article
2A experience will not be repeated, because Articles 3, 4 and 4A, which
also involved earlier California participation, did not incur the same
problems as Article 2A.
But not all bar or legislative study groups or law revision commis-
sions have the ability to so directly participate during the drafting stage.
While they should consider the product and advise the commissioners
and ALI members from their state, they often do not. Thus, if their
study comes after promulgation, and if they are to later forego "improv-
ing" the end product, practical questions remain: What should the func-
tion of a legislative or bar study committee or a law revision commission
be with respect to a uniform law? What about any real defects that
do appear? And what of the idea that the states are experimental
laboratories?
To answer the latter two queries first, the slogan of the NCCUSL
suggests one response: "diversity of thought, uniformity of law."'24
States must realize that each uniform law is not drafted in isolation, but
is shaped by input from various sources. Participating sources include
NCCUSL commissioners and ALI members from each state, partici-
pants from state bars or law revision commissions, observers and advi-
sors from groups interested in the legislation, and the American Bar
Association. These sources share experiences with the legal subject
under the diverse state laws. In short, experimentation has largely oc-
curred before a uniform law is formulated, and the best results from that
experimentation go into the uniform product.
24. See Miller, supra note 14, at 819.
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To the extent that the end product nonetheless is perceived to have
serious defects, as was the case with the original text of new Article 2A,
study and revision commissions should bring such problems to the atten-
tion of the existing NCCUSL/ALI committee for the article, or to the
PEB and to the NCCUSL's Uniform Commercial Code Committee.
Such an approach is preferable to individual cures, which are unlikely to
be uniformly accepted in other places and are likely to lead to more non-
uniformity. Indeed, this process was used by some state groups in con-
nection with Article 2A, and it produced amendments to that article in
1990, beyond those generated by California, thus better facilitating uni-
form enactment of Article 2A, rather than a state-by-state series of di-
verse non-uniform amendments.
In the future, moreover, it is unlikely that there will be twenty- to
thirty-year cycles for Code amendments. Such long periods lead to stat-
utes that are increasingly out-of-step with technology and commercial
practices, thereby inviting non-uniform amendments. Future uniform
amendments to the UCC are likely to be proposed as needed for enact-
ment in smaller packages at more frequent intervals. This will decrease
the pressure for state-by-state, non-uniform amendments.
Nonetheless, after experience under a uniform law, new issues are
certain to arise that call for legislative redress. While problems necessi-
tating possible amendment of the UCC should be brought to the atten-
tion of the PEB and NCCUSL's Uniform Commercial Code Committee
for national action, some non-uniform experimentation at this stage may
be desirable, which is best accomplished by bar study groups and organi-
zations like law revision commissions. Without that experimentation,
any later uniform amendment addressing the issue will be based on little
experience and, thus, will be less likely to work well.
Even with such experimentation, what can be termed "core uni-
formity" will almost always still exist. The problem arises because the
present law does not address new technology or practices, and thus con-
tains no uniform rule to be impaired. The problem may also arise be-
cause the unamended law does not address the perceived issue. In that
case, the ambiguous law may be interpreted in accord with any reason-
able solution provided by a non-uniform amendment. Thus, the non-
uniform amendments may even advance uniformity.25 Even when
25. Another vehicle developed to reduce non-uniformity arising from Code ambiguity is
the Commentary process of the PEB. See PEB Resolution on Purposes, Standards and Proce-
dures for PEB Commentary to the UCC, [PEB Commentaries] U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
vii (Mar. 14, 1987). Commentaries are well-reasoned positions, rather like updated comments
to the Code, that point the way to proper court interpretation of the Code. See id. To date,
[Vol. 26:703
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neither of these situations exists, if the problem arises because the law
outside the UCC is unclear and the non-uniform amendment brings the
transaction under the Code in an attempt to provide clarity, uniformity is
not harmed and experimentation is served. Ultimately, the results of this
experimentation can be used by the NCCUSL and the ALI to produce a
uniform amendment to the UCC.
Turning to the key inquiry: What should a legislative or bar study
committee or a law revision commission do if it does not initially partici-
pate in drafting, and if it refrains from reviewing a Code amendment for
style or substantive improvement? To enact any statute, a legislature
must be furnished with persuasive answers to three matters: (1) What
does the statute do? (2) Why is it needed? and (3) How would it change
present law? While any amendment to the UCC often addresses the first
two matters in a prefatory note, the comments or contemporary law re-
view articles, only a local group can address the second matter and the
third matter in context. Thus, this is one necessary function that a legis-
lative or other study group may perform. A second necessary function
that such a group may perform is to appropriately select any necessary
options, which may require considerable analysis to be done properly,
and to determine how the UCC amendment comports with the local ju-
risprudence for purposes of repeals and integration. A final function that
a legislative or other study group is well-suited to perform is to examine
how other local law relates to the new law.2 6 If these tasks are compe-
the PEB has issued nine commentaries resolving significant actual or potential splits of author-
ity. See PEB Commentary Nos. 1-7, [PEB Commentaries] U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
(Mar. 10, 1990); PEB Commentary No. 8, [PEB Commentaries] U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Calla-
ghan) (Dec. 10, 1991); PEB Commentary No. 9, [PEB Commentaries] U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Cal-
laghan) (June 25, 1992). Their effect is already being felt. See, eg., Utility Contracts Fin.
Servs. v. Amsouth Bank (In re Joe Morgan, Inc.), 130 B.R. 331, 334 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 1991)
(citing Permanent Editorial Board Commentary on U.C.C. § 9-309 in relation to secured party
priority disputes in receivables). In addition, one state bar study considered recommending
certain non-uniform amendments to address perceived ambiguities in the suretyship rules
under revised Article 3. However, a new PEB Commentary to address the ambiguities should
alleviate the need for the amendments.
26. An important function of law review commentary should be to address these types of
matters. See, e.g., Fred H. Miller et al., Leases of Goods in Oklahoma: The New Rules, 41
OKLA. L. REV. 417 (1988).
Unfortunately, the academic world often perceives that it is more fashionable and profita-
ble to criticize the substance of the Code revision effort. A classic piece in this genre is David
A. Rice, Lessons About the Realities of Contract for UC.C. Article 2 Revision and a Future
Software Contract Statute, 18 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 499 (1992). With all due
respect, some "realities" asserted by Professor Rice, which hardly are conclusively established
and seem derived more from perception than empirical evidence, are not the only "realities"
that need to be considered in the Code revision process. Indeed, to assert the former without
recognizing a second set of realities constituting what it is possible to negotiate in the process
April 1993]
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tently performed, they will more than occupy the time of the study group
performing them, and will return greater dividends than a review of the
style or substance of the uniform law which, almost inevitably, will result
in non-uniform changes that destroy the national consensus reached
through the NCCUSL and the ALI process.
Finally, what of federal preemption and internationalization in the
commercial law context? Preemption can be viewed as a result of the
failure of the state law system, rather than a sought-after consequence.
Thus, it seems clear that the Expedited Funds Availability Act would not
have been passed but for the failure of the commercial law system to
accomplish the reforms needed to address the issues through revision of
of formulating a Code revision, may potentially harm the Code and its uniformity. It is a
contribution to have Professor Rice's views early, as opposed to after the product is finished-
as has too often been the case. See, ag., Michael J. Herbert, A Draft Too Soon: Article 2A of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 93 COM. L.J. 413 (1988). It would be better, however, if these
views were expressed through the various avenues for participation in the evolution of the
statute, such as through membership in the UCC Committee of the American Bar Association,
which examines and comments on each UCC draft. If that route were taken, the resulting
tempering of the views might result in a compromise (as all legislation is), and thus in one
perspective a less than "ideal" product, but it would also produce a product that would be the
best draft obtainable under the circumstances. This is the other "reality," and that reality
needs recognition, explanation and support in the literature.
A related harm that can arise from failure to appreciate the actual considerations that go
into a statutory provision is evidenced in a student note by Robert M. Lewis, Note, Allocation
of Loss Due to Fraudulent Wholesale Wire Transfers: Is There a Negligence Action Against a
Beneficiary's Bank After Article 4A of the Uniform Commercial Code?, 90 MIcH. L. REV. 2565,
2579-80 (1992). The Note does not advocate rejection or amendment of the statute, but-
ignoring the careful balance crafted into Article 4A among the parties that participated in its
preparation and the policy goals that the deliberately chosen rules effectuate-advocates an
interpretation of Article 4A that in certain respects explicitly was sought to be avoided, as
explained in the comment to U.C.C. § 4A-102. To knowingly advocate such an interpretation
is disingenuous or irresponsible, and promotes a short-term view at the expense of a long-term
goal. This is a poor bargain, especially when several different rules might have been reasonably
chosen, even though the one preferred and now advocated was not.
The ultimate result of these untempered critical approaches can be well illustrated by the
decision in Greenwood Trust Co. v. Massachusetts, 971 F.2d 818 (1st Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 974 (1993). In Greenwood the court upheld, under a federal statute, the ability of a
state-chartered bank to export Delaware law on late fees into Massachusetts, which does not
allow such fees. Id. at 827. The decision, while correct, represents what one might expect
would be the conclusion to the type of process this Article argues against-a process that
derailed the attempt of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code to establish a uniform and reason-
able rule for state consumer credit legislation. Under this sort of conclusion in the context of
the Greenwood litigation, instead of a reasonable but perhaps less than "perfect" result, con-
sumers are powerless to prevent the law of the least common denominator state from eroding
greater local protection. On the other side, even though the battle in Greenwood was won after
much cost and uncertainty, creditors have many more battles to wage before the precise terms
of the law are clear. Is it sensible to accept such poor policy, uncertainty and costs because the
alternative represents a rule not to the complete liking of all? In the context of the UCC, is the
failure to comprehend this risk by far the greatest danger the Code faces?
IS KARL'S KODE KAPUT?
UCC Articles 3 and 4. The truth of this conclusion can be supported by
a number of collateral observations. First, instead of writing its own
rules for funds transfers in Regulation J, the Federal Reserve Board
largely adopted the consensus product worked out in Article 4A, gov-
erning funds transfers involving Fedwire in Regulation J.2 7 Second, even
though federal law gave the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
broad preemptive power to regulate transfers of investment securities and
thus the ability to supersede much of Articles 8 and 9 as to this type of
property,28 the SEC has instead chosen to participate in the state law
reform effort to revise Articles 8 and 9, at least as long as that effort is
making progress.29
Of course, the Code will always govern a large number of domestic
transactions, no matter what increase occurs in international law and
trade. However, to the extent that cross-border transactions are now
more significant, the Code may be harmonized with international rules,
or vice versa. For example, current Code revision efforts, like those for
Articles 2 and 5, focus on minimizing differences between domestic and
international governing laws.30 And, going the other way, the Model
Law on International Credit Transfers31 certainly would have been much
different if many of the participants who prepared Article 4A had not
also participated in negotiating the outcome of that international effort.32
IV. CONCLUSION
Karl Llewellyn's Code is still working. Perhaps it is not working
exactly as he envisioned,33 but nonetheless it is working successfully, and
beyond what might have been reasonably expected at its inception. In
27. 12 C.F.R. § 210.25(b) (1992) (incorporating U.C.C. art. 4A into Regulation J).
28. See Robert C. Mendelson, Investment Securities Review, 46 Bus. LAW. 1697, 1703-09
(1991).
29. See U.C.C. rev. art. 8 reporter's prefatory note (Tent. Draft May 1, 1992).
30. See Peter Winship, Domesticating International Commercial Law: Revising U. C. C. Ar-
ticle 2 in Light of the United Nations Sales Convention, 37 Loy. L. REV. 43 (1991); Peter
Winship, The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the Interna-
tional Unification of Private Law, 13 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 227 (1992).
31. See Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, U.N.
GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 17, Annex 1, at 48, U.N. Doe. A/47/17 (1992) (UNCITRAL
Model Law on International Credit Transfers as adopted May 15, 1992).
32. See FRED H. MILLER & ALVIN C. HARRELL, THE LAW OF MODERN PAYMENT
SYSTEMS AND NOTES 10-57 (2d ed. 1992).
33. In 1967 Llewellyn wrote that the Code "has already been mutilated by conditions and
by the ignorance of the bar, and will take a quarter-century to come into dominant force."
WALTER P. ARMSTRONG, JR., A CENTURY OF SERVICE: A CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 77 (1991). Cer-
tainly the latter statement has proven true. Hopefully, the first will not become true.
April 1993]
714 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:703
objective measure, the UCC is a living, vital document of more direct and
indirect relevance today than when it was initially promulgated. It is
likely to remain so, as long as people of dedication and goodwill contrib-
ute their energy to improving and promoting it, rather than to question-
ing reasonable results arrived at through a participatory and open
process. In short, the extent of the Code's well-being is up to each of us.
